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A persistent complaint in recent years about free-market capitalism has been a lack of
economic opportunity for the lower class, and rates of intergenerational social mobility
that are too low (Aaronson and Mazumder, 2008; Lee and Solon, 2009; Olivetti and
Paserman, 2015; OECD, 2018; Major and Machin, 2018; Piketty, 2020). The calls for
institutional change have intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has dis-
proportionately affected less-affluent people and likely impaired the future prosperity of
their children (Major and Machin, 2020; Blundell et al., 2020; Adams-Prassl et al., 2020).
However, the evidence that social and economic institutions significantly influence so-
cial mobility rates is limited.1 Measured social mobility rates differ across countries,
but is this a function of different social and economic institutions, or the composition of
populations, and the many other cultural ways in which countries vary?
In this paper, we look at a country, Hungary, in which a fairly homogeneous population
experienced two very different politcal, economic and social regimes between 1949 and
2017, Communism (1949-89), and Free-market Capitalism (1989-2017), and measure
whether the regimes had any effect on rates of social mobility. We measure the social
status of different groups within each regime by looking at the status of classes of sur-
names. We identify four sets of surnames in Hungary, two of high status and two of low.
The high-status surnames are first those ending in ..y, which was a traditional upper-
class surname type in Hungary, even as far back as the eighteenth century. These are the
names associated with the traditional Hungarian noble classes (though the association
is not deterministic). Additionally, we identify any surname that was unusually highly
represented among high school graduates 1920-39 compared to its estimated population
share. The low-status surnames were first the 20 most common surnames in Hungary.
The second low-status surname set consists of the surnames who were under-represented
1The recent studies look at within-country cross-regional determinants of social mobility and point out
to a positive effect of social capital, education and economic activity, and a negative of inequality
(Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez, 2014; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez and Turner, 2014; Corak,
2013; Güell et al., 2018).
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in high school education between 1920-39 relative to their population share.
We then calculate the estimated average status of these surnames in the years 1949-2017,
by comparing their representation among various elites (education, general and political),
relative to their share in the general population. From this, we can get decadal estimates
of social mobility, with those for 1950-1989 showing mobility within the Communist era,
and those for 1990-2017 showing mobility within the Free-market regime.
We find that social mobility rates throughout were low for both upper- and lower-class
families, with an underlying intergenerational correlation of status in the range 0.6-
0.8.2 Second, there was no greater rate of social mobility in the Communist era than
in the subsequent Free-market regime.3 Third, surnames associated with the Romani
minority throughout this period showed even lower social mobility rates, and indeed we
see divergence towards lower social status over time, even within the Communist era.
Fourth, the descendants of the eighteenth century upper classes in Hungary were still
significantly privileged through the years 1949-2017. Finally, we find that the political
representation of the surname groups changed starkly with regime changes, which makes
the apparent lack of effect of transitioning to democracy in 1989 more striking.
2. Historical context
Hungary suffered a devastating loss in World War II; the Red Army crossed its border
in late 1944 and started what would become an almost 47 year long occupation. The
Soviets, as they did in the rest of occupied Central and Eastern Europe, soon installed
2Individual level estimates usually show around 0.2 to 0.3 correlation across generations (Corak, 2013),
while group level estimates are in the 0.7-0.8 range (Clark, 2015), implying stronger persistence of
status. This is not a contradiction, as individual and group-level social mobility are related, but
distinct concepts (Solon, 2018). See 4.1 for more detail on this. See also Mazumder (2005) for a
discussion on how measurement error might affect the individual-level estimates.
3Low rates of social mobility during communism are also reported for China by Hao and Clark (2012).
The authors interpret it as the importance of kin networks in the intergenerational transmission of
status.
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a communist puppet government. As the Iron Curtain came down, Hungary became a
founding member of Comecon and later the Warsaw Pact, the respective economic and
defense organizations of the Eastern Bloc.
Countries under Soviet occupation followed a remarkably similar political and economic
path over the following decades (Fowkes, 1993). In all of them the left-wing parties
united under the leadership of the Stalinist hardliners during the year 1948. Centrist,
agrarian and moderate right wing parties were either abolished (as in Hungary) or were
reduced to a satellite status (as in East Germany). Political events followed very similar
patterns with show trials of non-communists and communists alike; persecution of any
dissent, setting up all-knowing secret police; harsh repression that in almost all countries
triggered a revolutionary response from society at one point. The communist parties
themselves, though had rather different organizational and sociological origins (Seton-
Watson, 1958), evolved quite similarly later on (Hanley, 2003).
Communist countries of the Eastern Bloc undertook similar, transformative economic
and social policies. Some form of land reform took place everywhere as early as 1945,
followed by forced collectivization from around the year 1948, which went on full-swing
until the mid 1950s, and was completed by the 1960s. Industry was gradually nation-
alized as part of a switch from a free-market to a planned economy, starting from the
biggest manufacturing firms and banks, then proceeding to the middle-sized enterprises,
down to the small family-owned businesses. By 1952, the share of the socialized sector
was between 77% and 100% in industrial output. In the trade sector the range was 54%
to 98% (Swain and Swain, 2017). In both dimensions East Germany represented the
least collectivized end of the spectrum, while Bulgaria was the opposite, and Hungary
was around the median (exactly the median with 97% rate of industrial collectivization,
and close to the median of 88% with its own 82% in terms of trade collectivization).
Nationalization of private property (land, real estate, businesses, assets) thus took place
everywhere with some local differences; Hungarians were more likely to keep their res-
idential real estate, while agricultural collectivization was much less intense in Poland
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(Hanley and Treiman, 2004).
Besides the fundamental change in the ownership structure of the means of production,
all Eastern Bloc countries started forced industrialization, with around 50% rates of
investment into industry and around a mere 10% into agriculture (Swain and Swain,
2017).
Communist countries reformed education as well, mostly on the extensive margin. En-
rollment in secondary education expanded rapidly everywhere, and became almost uni-
versal by the communism; the expansion of tertiary education was less steep, but enroll-
ment rates increased and reached double digits everywhere. This facilitated access, but
parental education’s role in explaining children’s educational attainment even increased
over time (Nieuwbeerta and Rijken, 1996).
Social mobility studies that looked at occupation category correlations of parents and
children under communism found that social mobility rates across Eastern Bloc countries
were similar to one another throughout the whole period (domański, 1998; Domański,
1999). The wage structure in all communist countries (including Hungary) was com-
pressed; returns to skills was much smaller compared to Western countries or to returns
after transition to capitalism later on, which brought a large and rapid increase in in-
come inequality (Who has gotten ahead after the fall of Communism? The case of the
Czech Republic, author=Matvejuu, Petr and Lim, Nelson, journal=Czech Sociological
Review, pages=117–136, year=1995, publisher=JSTOR, n.d.; Chase, 1998; Brainerd,
1998; Kertesi and Köll, 2002; Münich et al., 2005). Milanovic (1999) finds that Gini
coefficients of income were rather similar (between 19.8 and 25) before transition in six
Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia and Slovenia),
and increased everywhere later on, with Hungary experiencing less increase than most
other countries, but still very close to Poland, Slovenia and Latvia.
Besides the explosion of the rigid wage structure, the other major change of transition
was the restitution of confiscated property. Hungary chose voucher compensation (with
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a cap on value); major industrial companies were sold off for cash rather than returned
to their former owners (Kozminski, 1997). Hanley and Treiman (2004) find similar rates
of property ownership in Hungary compared to other former communist countries in the
early 90s.
3. Social Mobility and Institutional Change
The most popular formal economic models of social mobility is Becker and Tomes (1979).
The authors argue that social status for any individual has two components: a transitory
component, which is not transmitted to subsequent generations, and a persistent com-
ponent that is strongly transmitted. As explicated by Solon (1999) the model assumes
a parent (generation t−1) and one child (generation t), where the parent allocates their
lifetime earnings yt−1 between their own consumption Ct−1 and investment Ht−1 in the
child’s earnings capacity. Parents cannot borrow on behalf of their children to invest in
their human capital because of imperfect capital markets. With this specification:
yt = (1 + r)Ht−1 + Et (1)
where r is the return to human capital investment, and Et is child ability. It is also
assumed that ability is inherited from the parent, but with random components:
Et = et + ut = λet−1 + vt + ut (2)
Suppose that the parent has a Cobb-Douglas utility function in Ct−1 and yt, with weight
α on their own consumption. Equating the marginal utilities from own consumption
with child’s income under the budget constraint yields the following optimal level of




1 + αryt−1 −
α
1 + αr (λet−1 + vt + ut) (3)
It is clear from this equation that high-income parents invest more in child’s human
capital than low-income ones. The effect of ability is ambiguous, on the one hand, high-
able parents have higher income and thus invest more, on the other, high-able parents
expect that their children will be also of high ability and thus consuming more yields
relatively higher utility. The overall effect of ability is positive when the weight on own
consumption and/or the intergenerational transmission of ability are low.4
The correlation between parents’ and child’s lifetime income in the steady state is:
ρ = δβ + (1− δ) β + λ1 + βλ (4)




This model has few predictions about the effects of different social and political regimes
on social mobility. The introduction of communism brought almost a complete elimi-
nation of income from private capital and a substantial compression of wages through
centralization of wage-setting process (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). This can be
conceptualized in the Becker and Tomes model as a reduction in the return to human
capital investment r. A falling returns reduces the dispersion of income σ2y (Mavridis
and Mosberger, 2017), without influencing the dispersion of ability σ2u .
The fall of the rate of return to human capital investment reduces the intergenerational
correlation of income through two channels. First, by directly changing the relative prices
of consumption and children’s’ lifetime earnings in the parents’ utility maximization
problem. That is, the lower rate of return makes investment in children’s earnings
relatively less attractive compared to consumption. Second, indirectly through reduced
4That is, when α(1 + λ) < 1.
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dispersion of income. Since the investment in children’s human capital increases with
parental income, compression of the distribution of income also reduces the dispersion
of parental investment.
Conversely, the transition from communism to capitalism signified a substantial rise in
the return to human capital investment (Campos and Jolliffe, 2003; Keane and Prasad,
2002), leading to a rise in the dispersion of income (Mavridis and Mosberger, 2017)
without altering the dispersion of ability. The growing r should thus increase the inter-
generational correlation of income directly and through the increase in the dispersion of
income.
Many other arguments on the potential negative effect of switching from communism
to capitalism on social mobility have been articulated in the voluminous economic and
sociology literature on socio-economic inequalities under Communism (Bergson, 1944;
Morrisson, 1984; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Hanley and Treiman, 2004). A large
portion of all wealth was nationalized under communism, and in all countries some form
of restitution took place after transition to capitalism; under communism, downward
job mobility of former elites was enforced in some areas; policies aimed at equalizing
opportunities and enhancing mobility were implemented upon communist takeovers,
which were later lifted etc.
There are, however, several arguments on why social mobility might not necessarily be
different under Communism and Capitalism. The Becker and Tomes model is a model
of the transmission of permanent income across generations, where human capital plays
a significant role, but the transmission of human capital itself is not explicitly modeled.
Parental investment in the human capital of the child can take the form of a transfer of
physical or financial assets, or the investment of parental productive time (which could
have been used for generating income). Therefore, parents face a trade-off between their
own consumption and the future earnings of their children. In reality, however, parents
might influence the latter without sacrificing own consumption, for instance, by choosing
residential location, providing access to social networks or sharing books and knowledge
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(Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez, 2014; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a,b; Bell et al., 2019).
If this is the case, the differences in the dispersion of income across social regimes might
not matter for the intergenerational correlation of status.
The simple version of the model does not consider the existence of capital markets,
which weakens a connection between parental income and investment in human capital
of the offspring. The introduction of capitalism after 1989 brought a development of the
capital market in Hungary. Although low-income individuals were still facing significant
credit constraints (Popov, 2014), the financial market provided options, which were not
available under communism. The positive effect of the broadening access to credit on the
intergenerational social mobility could thus partially offset the negative effect of higher
income inequality.
Well-known features of socialism, such as shortages, queuing, or preferential access to
closed shops or certain services by the nomenklatura (Bergson, 1984; Atkinson and Mick-
lewright, 1992) could imply an existence of an informal cap on consumption. Therefore,
high-income parents might invest relatively more in the human capital of children com-
pared to a regime with the same level of income inequality, but no constraints on con-
sumption. Consequently, the social mobility rates under communism might be relatively
low despite the significant reduction in the dispersion of income. However, the general
consensus in the literature is that the non-monetary aspects of consumption and earnings
under communism did not systematically favour low- vs. high-income families (Bergson,
1944; Morrisson, 1984; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Milanovic, 1998).
Finally, others have argued that we should not necessarily see an abrupt change in social
stratification (and as a consequence, mobility) upon transition to capitalism, because
status transmission is mostly governed by education in all industrialized countries (com-
munist and capitalist alike); or because the skills (or connections) that determined elite
status in communism were readily usable, or convertible to capital under capitalism
(Hanley and Treiman, 2004).
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4. Measurement of Social Mobility
4.1. Empirical Model
We follow studies of social mobility rates at the group level (Güell et al., 2007; Collado
et al., 2012; Clark and Cummins, 2014; Clark et al., 2015). We implement the method-
ology in Clark and Cummins (2014) and model observed status for any individual as
a function of a persistent, group level component, that is strongly transmitted across
generations, and a transitory, individual level component, which is not transmitted. Our
measure of social mobility is the intergenerational correlation of the transmitted group
level component of social status. We chose this method because it uses data that is rel-
atively easily accessible (the general surname distribution of the population and name
lists of members of the elite groups). Torche and Corvalan (2018) show analytically that
total social mobility (i.e., the persistence of an outcome between a pair of an adult child
and their parent) is a weighted average of the persistence of the individual level com-
ponents and the persistence of the group averages, where the weights are given by the
respective variance share of the individual and the group level components. Accordingly,
our findings could be interpreted as between-group estimates of social mobility.
In this framework, the status y of each individual i from group g in each generation t is
composed of an underlying group-level component x and a transitory component u:
ygit = x
g
t + ugit (5)
Group level status is inherited strongly at the rate ρ with non-negative multiplicative
error eit , so that the latent status of group g at time t is:
xgt = ρxgt−1 · eit. (6)
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In order to estimate the social mobility rate in Hungary (i.e., the intergenerational
correlation ρ), we need to construct a measure of the latent mean social status xgt . In
what follows, we present a methodology of estimating xgt using the data on membership in
various elites: education, general and political. The educational elites are graduates from
medical and technical universities. The general elites are captured by patenting inventors
and people listed in "Who is Who" books. The political elites consist of members of the
Hungarian parliament and members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
We define social groups g as groups of individuals with surnames of particular origin.
In particular, we identify traditional upper- and underclass surnames in Hungary (we
discuss this in detail in the next subsection) and we treat all individuals with such
surnames as members of either upper or lower class.
The idea is to infer the latent mean social status of certain surname groups from their
membership in elites. This approach requires two types of data. The first is the popu-
lation shares in Hungary of traditional upper- and underclass surnames. The second is
the shares of these surnames in various elites. In addition, we must make the following
three assumptions:
(a) Social status in Hungary is normally distributed with constant variance across
generations (ugit ∼ N(0, σ2g)).
(b) The target surname groups had the same variance of social status as the population
as a whole among their members (σg = σ for all g).
(c) Members of the elite represent some portion (αt%) of the top of the social status
distribution in Hungary.
We specify αt% in a way that it tracks potential changes in the relative "eliteness" of the
occupation (the exact method is somewhat different across elite groups, so we discuss it
in detail in Section 4.3 below). In the Appendix we show that the results are virtually
unchanged if we assume that αt% = 1% across all elites, which is the approach taken by
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Clark (2015).
Suppose an individual enters the elite if her status is above a time-variant threshold
(which is common across groups):
ygit > yt.
The probability that a current member from group g enters the elite is:
P gelite = P (x
g
t + ugit > yt) = 1− P (u
g
it < yt − x
g








where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We





= Φ−1 (1− P gelite) (7)
This relationship holds also for the entire population. Without a loss of generality,
assuming that xt = 0 (which means that xgt is defined relative to the social mean) the




= Φ−1 (1− Pelite) , (8)
where Pelite is the overall exclusiveness of the elite. This shows that the threshold for
entering the elite is implicitly pinned down by Pelite and σ. Subtracting 7 from 8:













The first term on the left hand side is the same as αt% from Assumption (c). In our
baseline results we calculate this from the data, and in the Appendix we show that the
results are similar if a constant exclusiveness is assumed instead for each elite group (that
is, that elites represent the top 1% of Hungarian society). How we calculate exclusivity
differs across data sources, so we deal with this in Section 4.3.
The second term we can calculate from the relative representation of group g in the
elite. The relative representation is the ratio of the group’s share in the elite and its
population share.5
Given the Assumption (b), the second term of the right hand side of Equation 9 dis-
appears (i.e., the estimated social status does not depend on the threshold y
t
). In the
Appendix B, we illustrate the potential bias resulting from the violation of this assump-
tion, but we also show that assuming different variances has a relatively small effect on
the estimates empirically, and that it converges to zero over time.6
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition on how we attribute to each surname group in each
period an implied average social status. If we know how over or under-represented a
group is among the elite we can then estimate its mean social status. Assuming medical
graduates, for example, represent the top 1% of the distribution, if we observe that a
particular surname type has 3% of its members found among medical graduates, then this
will translate into that group having an average status that is 0.45 standard deviations
above the social mean.
5Define the relative representation of group g as RRg = #g in elite#elite /
#g
#pop . The relative representation
is informative in itself, as it shows how over-represented (or under-represented) is group g in the elite
compared to its population share. Theoretically we can think of the relative representation as follows:
RRg = P (group=g|elite)P (group=g) . We can calculate the share of population in certain elite P (elite) =
#elite
#pop (or
assume that they represent a top portion of the population). Multiplying the relative representation
with P (elite) we obtain:
P (group = g|elite)P (elite)
P (group = g) =
P (group = g ∩ elite)
P (group = g) = P (elite|group = g) = P
g
elite
6In particular, we carry out robustness checks where we set the educational status threshold for doctors
at 0.5% and 2%, and where we allow the upper- and underclass surname groups to have a variance



















Figure 1: Illustration of estimating social mobility rates from surname distributions
Note: The figure shows how we infer latent social status xt of a certain group from its observed shares
in the elite. The solid line represents the status distribution of the population. We assume that 1%
of the whole population makes it into the elite, which defines the cutoff level of social status needed
to join the elite (represented by the Top 1% vertical dashed line). Next we turn to the dotted curve,
which is the status distribution of the group in the 0th generation. Knowing the share of the group
who made it to the elite (the mass of individuals beyond the cutoff of Top 1%) and the variance of
the group’s distribution is the same as the population, we can infer its mean relative to the population
mean. Doing the same with the next generation data we can infer the speed of convergence to the mean
over a generation for the group.
Having estimated the implied mean of status for an upper- or underclass surname type
in each decade 1950-2020, we can then calculate for each decade the implied correlation
of status bg10 with the previous decade. From Equations 5 and 6:
ln xgt = ln xg0 + ln bg10 × t+ ln εgt (10)
where εgt is an error term corresponding to mis-measurements, and bg10 is the correlation
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of status across a decade. We can estimate ln bg10 by regressing the logarithm of the
calculated latent status on a constant and a time trend using OLS. Then, assuming that
a generation is 30 years, the implied intergenerational correlation of underlying status
for group g is given by
ρg = (bg10)3 (11)
4.2. High and Low Status Surnames
The first high status surname group we focus on are surnames ending in ..y, which in
our study period constituted typically 2% of the population.7 In pre-modern Hungary,
there was a set of surnames that could be written with either an ..i or ..y ending. These
surnames supposedly signified a location from which the family is originally from, or
where their family estates were located. The ..y spelling was considered more archaic
and elegant very early on, and became widely associated with the nobility.
Perhaps the most famous example for this class of surnames is former French president
Nicolas Sarkozy, whose father (Pál István Ernő Sárközy de Nagy-Bócsa) was born to a
family of the Hungarian lesser nobility that gained its title in the 17th century fighting
the Ottoman Empire. Former Paraguayan president Juan Carlos Wasmosy is also a
descendant of a Hungarian family with a ..y name who emigrated to the Americas in the
early 19th century. The first Hungarian prime minister was also from a ..y named family
(Lajos Batthyány in 1848); also the first prime minister of Hungary within Austria-
Hungary (Gyula Andrássy in 1867). Of the 21 Hungarian governments of Austria-
Hungary a total of 9 was led by a ..y named politician.8 The interwar right-wing regime
was led by Miklós Horthy as governor; four out of the fourteen prime ministers he
7With the exception of names ending in ..gy, ..ly, ..ny and ..ty, which are not ..y ending names, as
these letter pairs form single consonants in the Hungarian language.
8Gyula Andrássy, Menyhért Lónyay, József Szlávy, Gyula Szapáry, Dezső Bánffy, Géza Fejérváry,
Károly Khuen-Héderváry twice, Móric Esterházy
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appointed also had a ..y ending family name.9 When the monarchy was abolished after
World War II, the first president of the republic was Zoltán Tildy. Perhaps unsurprsingly,
the communist regimes were the only ones that had no ..y named heads of state or heads
of government (neither the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919-20 nor the
Hungarian People’s Republic between 1949 and 1989). As of now, Péter Medgyessy,
the 6th prime minister of the Third Republic (in office from 2002 to 2004) was the last
head of government with a ..y name. 29% of all Hungarian prime ministers came from
a ..y named family, which corresponds to a rate of over-representation of a factor of 15
compared to the current population share of such names. Two of the ten Hungarian
Nobel-laurates had a ..y ending family name (György Békésy and György Hevesy).
Although there is no deterministic relationship between being a noble and having a ..y
ending family name, we are able to demonstrate the socially elite status of these names
as far back as the eighteenth century in a number of ways. In the 1720 census of the
taxpayer population (which excluded high nobility), a member of the petty nobility was
three times more likely to have a ..y ending name than non-nobles (14% vs. 5%). In
the conscription of the nobility of 1755, which was a list of tax-exempt nobles who were
not part of the high aristocracy, the ..y name share was even higher at 25%. Finally in
the complete list of the land-owning aristocracy in 1767, the ..y ending covered a full
40% of the high aristocracy. Thus in eighteenth-century Hungary the higher the social
status, the greater the overrepresentation of the ..y surname.10
At the dawn of the revolution of 1848, some members of the progressive elite with noble
backgrounds voluntarily and demonstratively change their names to the more plebeian
..i ending. Nevertheless, having a ..y ending name was closely correlated with military
rank even in the revolutionary army (“Honvédség”). In 1848 non-commissioned officers
were twice as likely to have ..y ending name than privates, while commissioned officers
9Béla Imrédy, László Bárdossy, Miklós Kállay, Döme Sztójay
10The 1720 census is available at https://adatbazisokonline.hu/adatbazis/az-1720_-evi-orsz
agos-osszeiras; we digitalized the 1755 census of the nobility from Illésy (1902); the list of the
land owners in 1767 is from the Urbarium of 1767, available at https://archives.hungaricana.h
u/en/urberi/.
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were five times more likely (Mikár, 1891).
Surnames ending in ..y were still considered a mark of privilege in the late nineteenth
century, and were put under protection when many thousands “Hungarianized” family
names which suggested foreign origin.11 Consequently, it has been legally impossible to
adopt such a name since the 1880s (Karády and Kozma, 2002, p.61). In the few cases
that a ..y name was adopted, it was mostly because the family was ennobled at the
same time.12 Notably, names of archaic orthography, such as those ending in ..y, are
still legally protected in Hungary. The 2010 Law on Civil Procedure states that “historic”
(article 4/B of §49) and “archaic” (article 4/C of §49) names cannot be adopted. Thus
the majority of holders of ..y surnames 1945 and later were the descendants of the upper
classes of the nineteenth century.
The second elite group is just all surnames where there was at least one high school
graduate 1920-39, and where the ratio of graduates to the relative frequency in the
population was in the upper quartile of all surnames.13 High school graduates in the
years 1920-39 were still only an estimated 2-5% of each cohort, depending on the year.
The first underclass group is consists of those with the 20 most common surnames
in Hungary in the 20th century.14 These surnames, which are held by 20-25% of the
population from 1945 on, were under-represented among Hungarian educational and
occupational elites, including high school graduates, in all periods before 1945. To see
why this is the case, we need to look at the history of surname use.
11See Chapter 3 of Gáspár (2019) for a more detailed description.
12As was the family of the Nobel-laurate György Hevesy. Another, similar avenue of getting a ..y name
was the admission to the Knightly Order of the Vitéz during the Horthy regime. As the head of
state was legally just regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, he had no constitutional authority to make
noblemen. The Order of the Vitéz filled the same purpose.
13We have access to a list of high school graduates compiled by historians Zsuzsa Bíró, Viktor Karády,
and Péter Tibor Nagy (the data set used in (the one used in Karády (2012)). We owe gratitude
to Viktor Karády and Péter Tibor Nagy for allowing us to use their data. We divide a surname’s
frequency among graduates with its frequency in a large sample of weddings between 1895 and 1939.
We are grateful to the Hungarian Association for Family History Research for giving us access to
this data set.
14As we consider any surname that was in the top20 in any of our 20th century data points, the list
actually has 23 surnames.
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Hungarian society adopted surnames during the high to late middle ages; the nobles
were the first to do so, town-dwelling commoners the next, and serfs the last (Karády
and Kozma, 2002). As keeping track of the lineage was of vital importance to the land
holding class, they chose distinctive surnames based on the area they owned (which is
the origin of the ..y ending names), or the name of an ancestor (which is the origin of
the ..fi ending names, the Hungarian equivalent if the ..son/..sen ending in Germanic
languages). Distinction was less important for commoners, so their family names started
out simply as nicknames, which bore reference to the owners’ profession, social status,
ethnic origin, or physical appearance. In our group of the most common Hungarian
surnames we find 8 (or 9) surnames indicating professions 6 (or 7) surnames referring to
physical characteristics, 5 surnames referring to ethnicity or country of origin (or likeness
of such), and one referring to social status.15 Surnames (especially those of the common
people) first were not inherited, just used for distinguishing between two people having
the same first name; having an inherited, patrilineal surname only became commonplace
by the start of the 17th century. However, feudalism in Hungary persisted well into the
middle of the 19th century, so the status of the holders of these names could only have
started to regress to the mean three generations prior to our analysis.
The second low-status surname set consists of the surnames that occur at least twenty
times more frequently among marriages as among high school graduates 1920-1939.
The third underclass group is a set of surnames associated with the Romani minor-
ity. These were identified first as names that the Hungarian Encyclopedia of Surnames
recognizes as Romani surnames. Most of the Romani, however, have common Magyar
surnames, so the names we found in this way represent a very small percentage of the
15Professions: Juhász - shepherd, Kovács - smith, Lakatos - locksmith, Mészáros - butcher, Molnár -
miller, Szabó - taylor, Takács- weaver, Varga - leatherworker;
Physical characteristics: Farkas - wolf (hunter, or has the physical properties of a wolf), Fehér -
white, Fekete - black, Kis - little, Nagy - big, Balogh - Left-handed, unlucky
Ethnicity or culture: Tót - Slovak, generic term for anyone of Slavic origin in the middle ages, Német
- German, Oláh - Romanian, Rácz - Serbian or anyone from the south, Török - Turkish
The rest: Pap - priest (serf belonging to a church property), Simon - Biblical origin, Szilágyi - "from
Szilágy"; Szilágy is a common settlement name and later the name of a county. Source: Hajdú
(2010)
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population (less than 0.1%). The Romani minority is associated with much higher fer-
tility than the rest of the Hungarian population in recent decades (Pénzes et al., 2018).
Thus, we identified also as Romani-associated surnames those with a growth rate of
more than 10% between their respective population counts in 1998 and in 2016.16
4.3. Data
The estimation of surname-based social mobility measures requires two types of data.
The first is the population shares of traditional upper- and underclass surnames. The
second is the shares of these surnames in various elites.
4.3.1. Population shares
We estimate population shares of surname groups from a sample of the marriage records
1940-1951 and the complete population registers of 1998 and 2016, interpolating for the
years 1952-1997, and 1999-2015.
The sample of marriages contains 842,000 people, and it was digitalized by the Hungarian
Society for Family History Research.17 As the goal of the compilers is to digitalize all
available records, we assume that the data represent a random sample of all marriages in
this period. Before World War II, the average annual number of marriages was 16,672,
but after the number dropped to 6,774 marriages annually. The coverage rate as a share
of all marriages is 9.5% in 1938, and 2.5% in 1949 (Balázs, 1993).
16The average growth rate identified as Romani by the Encyclopedia of Surnames 1998-2016 was 17%.
The names that had the highest growth rates between 1998 and 2016 were those potentially at-
tributable to recent immigration (e.g. Asian and Middle Eastern names). To avoid confounding
these with Romani names, we also imposed a requirement that a name included in our set had to
have at least as many occurrences in 1998 as the least common name that was associated with the
Romani in the Encyclopedia.
17The records were digitized by the Hungarian Society for Family History Research, who kindly shared
the yearly surname distribution. The dataset is at http://www.macse.hu/databases/en/defaul
t.aspx.
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We obtained the complete surname distribution of Hungary in 1998 and 2016 from the
Ministry of the Interior. The data includes the list of all surnames and the exact number
of people having them, excluding (for privacy reasons) only the surnames held by a single
person.
4.3.2. Elite groups
Educational elites. We consider three different sets of elite groups: educational,
general and political. We capture educational elites from three data sources. The first
and most comprehensive is the distribution of surnames of Hungarian medical school
graduates. We have records of all medical graduates from Hungarian universities from
1940 to 2017.18 The list of graduates was provided by the State Healthcare Service
Center. In order to measure the change in the relative "eliteness" of the medical profession
(αt%) we calculate the share of all medical graduates as a percentage of the cohort of
the 25 years old in every year. The latter information is available at the web page
of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH).19 During the whole study period
the share of medical graduates remains remarkably stable around 1% of the respective
cohort. Quantitative evidence shows that the medical degree has been reliably the most
attractive towards the best students as late as 2008 to 2015 (Fábri, 2016).
The next educational elite are the PhD graduates of Budapest University of Technology
and Economics, whose names we collected from the Millennium Yearbook issued by
the university in 2000 (Kiss, 2000). It allows us to estimate social mobility rates from
1960 to 2000. In the case of PhD graduates we keep track of the relative "eliteness" by
assuming that the group represented the top 1% in the 1960s, and then its exclusivity
changed proportionally to the total number of PhD graduates (i.e. during the seventies
the number of graduates increased by 46% relative to the sixties, so we assumed an αt
18We have the records of all institutions that trained physicians in Hungary 1940-2017. (Kapronczay,




Finally, we constructed the list of those who earned a (non-doctoral) university diploma
using the university yearbooks that were published on the university website from 1962
to 1999.20 Non-medical degree programmes at universities were uniformly 5 years long
in the period covered by our data. Because of this, we will refer this group as "Masters"
(as they earned the equivalent of a combination of a Bachelor of Sciences and a Master
of Sciences degree). In their case the relative "eliteness" measure is the share of people
with any university degree in the young adult cohort to account for a general university
diploma inflation that took place over time.
General elites. We capture general elites by looking at inventors and people men-
tioned in the Hungarian edition of "Who is Who". The data on Hungarian inventors come
from the worldwide patent statistical database PATSTAT. We create a list of unique
inventor-decade-application observations starting from 1970, the year when Hungary
joined the World Intellectual Property Organisation.21. We look at applications instead
of granted patents; we do not distinguish between Hungarian and international applica-
tions.
The second general elite name set is based on the scanned version of the Hungarian
edition of Hübners Who is Who, a collection of biographies of famous people (Gábor
et al., 2011).22 The Who is Who reflects a general idea of "being famous" for any reason.
Unfortunately, we do not know which year any person entered Who is Who, just their
year of birth. Because of this, we created a panel of synthetic cohorts where every
individual is assigned to the cohort when they turned 23.
In case of the general elites we assumed that in the first decade of the data set their
20The yearbooks are available at https://library.hungaricana.hu/hu/collection/egyetemi_jeg
yzokonyvek_bme_evkonyv/
21Usually patenting an invention is connected with several applications, called a family. We collapse
the data to families instead of individual patents.
22we thank Ádám Szeidl, Miklós Koren and András Vereckei for letting us use this data.
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relative exclusivity was α1 = 1%, and then adjusted it according to the number of
inventors and Who is Who items per decade. So 7265 individuals applied for patents
in our sample in the 1970s, and we assign 1% eliteness to this value; if this number
increased to 14530 in a subsequent decade, we would adjust the exclusiveness of the
inventor group to 2%.
Political elites. Finally, we also look at political elites. We include in this group
two sets of names, first is the members of parliament, the second is the members of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
The first democratic elections after World War II were held in November 1945; partic-
ipation was free except for prominent parties of the preceding right-wing regime. The
subsequent 1947 elections were marked by voter fraud by the Communist Party, who
won the plurality of the votes, but were still very far from commanding a majority in the
National Assembly with 22.25% of the overall vote. They took power nevertheless, and
between 1949 and 1980 parliamentary "elections" featured a single communist-backed
candidate by electoral district. The first multiple-candidate elections took place in 1985,
but still the overwhelming majority of candidates were party members, so this "thawing"
of the regime was largely for show only. After the transition to democracy, the first free
and fair elections took place in 1990.
We manually collected the list of all members of the Hungarian Parliament ever since it
first convened as an elected, representative legislature in 1848. For the pre-1990 cycles
we used three main sources. The primary sources were the Almanacs of the Hungarian
National Assembly and the address books of the Hungarian National Assembly. For
electoral cycles where these did not provide name lists of the representatives, we used
the verbatim records of the first session following the election where the credentials were
passed to all newly elected members.23 The data source for the post-communist period




is the current home page of the Hungarian National Elections.24
We complement the picture of political elites with the data on the members of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences.25 The Hungarian Academy of Sciences was established
from private donations in 1825 as a body of scholars deemed best at their fields whose
goal was to preserve and promote Hungarian culture and science. In its present form,
new members are elected by current members, and the maximum number of members
under the age of 70 is fixed by law at 200 (Act XL of 1994 on the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences). Although this recruitment procedure lends a great degree of formal in-
dependence to the body, because of the high standing and authority of the members
and the body as a whole, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has always had political
importance. Communists in 1949 purged members who were deemed ideologically unfit,
whose membership was restored after the democratic transition.
Before turning to the analysis we have to fix three issues. First, to have an overall picture
of Hungarian society we exclude foreigners whenever their presence in the data would
be an issue. In the case of the medical graduates, the State Healthcare Center data lets
us directly exclude foreign medical students. In the case of the graduates of Budapest
University of Technology and Economics, if the nationality of the students were listed
we used this information to detect foreigners, otherwise, we detected foreign students
based on their names. We do not face this problem neither with the general elite data,
nor with the political elite data.26
Second, as all our sample included women as well, we have to overcome the issue of
changing surnames upon marriage. In Hungary, the most common way of changing
surname upon marriage is to chose the surname of the husband and augment it with a
Session records: https://library.hungaricana.hu/hu/collection/orszaggyulesi_dokumentumok/
24https://www.parlament.hu/web/guest/kepviselok-elozo-ciklusbeli-adatai
25Available from Markó et al. (2003); more recent appointments can be found on the homepage, see
https://mta.hu/mta_tagjai.
26The general elite data includes only Hungarian nationals, we did not have to adjust it. Members
of Parliament are also Hungarian nationals. While the Hungarian Academy of Sciences confers
honorary memberships to scholars in other countries, we limit our attention to full and corresponding
members, who are all Hungarian nationals as well.
23
special ending (“né”) and either keeping the maiden name as a second surname or drop
the maiden name entirely. Due to this rule, we can tag married women based on their
name, and for most of them, we can recover their maiden name as well. We used the
maiden name in the analysis whenever it was possible. We handled this issue in the
same way in all the data sources. Table 1 shows the number of observations by sample
and decades. As a robustness check, we carried out the analysis separately by genders
using the medical data (where this information was given), and we found no significant
differences in social mobility rates.
Third, the political elites contain very limited number of individuals, even compared to
the other elite groups. Elections take place only every 4 to 5 years, and there is a large
continuity in membership from one cycle to the next. The composition of the Academy
changes even more slowly (most of the time). Also, we cannot make the assumption that
people become members of these bodies at a certain age. Consequently, we can only work
with relative representation ratios with these data, as our model for calculating latent
social status is not applicable in their case. For the parliament we calculate relative
representation ratios over time for each election cycle. For the Academy of Sciences we
create a yearly pseudo-panel where the observations reflect the name structure in any
given year, and we calculate relative representation figures from this data.
4.4. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the observation counts from each set of elite names. Table 2, Panel A
shows the estimated population share of each surname group in 1940-2017. We see
significant differences between the 1940s and the 1950s due to World War II and its
aftermath, which dramatically reshaped Hungarian society and its surname distribution
with it.27. Two important features of the data are the gradual decrease in the share
27The Hungarian Jewry was among those Jewish communities of Europe that suffered the highest loss
of life both in absolute and relative terms during the Holocaust (Braham, 1981). After the war,
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans fled or were driven out of Hungary. At the same time,
neighboring countries, such as Czechoslovakia, expelled large chunks of the ethnic Hungarian pop-
24







Inventors Who is Who Parliament Members of
the HAS
1950 10115 25 636 49
1960 13313 1198 16174 3524 689 61
1970 10950 1747 28192 7265 11692 704 123
1980 10604 2319 19836 24223 18179 738 88
1990 9745 1750 15294 12522 13624 1212 157
2000 10770 8683 11221 818 117
2010 12663 6836 829 117
Total 78160 7039 79496 59529 58240 5626 712
Note: The table shows the number of people in all elite occupations available to our analysis aggregated
to decades. Medical doctors correspond to the sum of Hungarian nationals who graduate from one
of the four Hungarian medical faculties (Semmelweis in Budapest, and the universities in the towns
of Debrecen, Pécs and Szeged). Technical PhD-s and Technical Masters corresponds to graduates of
Budapest University of Technology. Inventors are collected from the PATSTAT database. Who is
Who corresponds to names in Hübner’s Who is Who (Gábor et al., 2011). Members of Parliament are
counted in election years and include everyone who win a parliamentary seat during the election cycle
(special elections included after 1990). Members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in this table
are newly elected full members or corresponding members in each decade.
of the ..y surnames (by about 25%) over two generations and the more than two-fold
increase of the share of the Romani-associated surnames over the same horizon. As we
show in Section 5.2, the estimates of the actual Romani population share (which are
scarce) show a similar trend. Otherwise, the name distribution is very similar in the
1950s as in the 1990s and 2010s.
ulation. In the meantime, many people from the Slavic minorities in Hungary decided to emigrate
to neighboring Slavic-majority countries. Many of those who had Jewish, German or Slavic back-
grounds and decided to remain chose to adopt a Hungarian surname. This movement lost intensity
by the 1950s (Karády and Kozma, 2002)
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Table 2: Social status of surname types, 1940-2017 - medical graduates












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Population shares
1940-49 0.025 0.005 0.232 0.074 0.012
1950-59 0.024 0.005 0.255 0.071 0.013
1960-69 0.022 0.005 0.249 0.070 0.016
1970-79 0.021 0.005 0.243 0.070 0.020
1980-89 0.020 0.006 0.237 0.069 0.023
1990-99 0.019 0.006 0.231 0.068 0.026
2000-09 0.018 0.006 0.229 0.068 0.029
2010-19 0.018 0.006 0.229 0.068 0.032
Panel B: Relative representation among doctors, vs total population
1940-49 4.57 5.80 0.52 0.05 0.81
1950-59 4.01 2.93 0.57 0.67 0.56
1960-69 3.72 3.34 0.66 0.68 0.49
1970-79 3.22 2.57 0.70 0.60 0.43
1980-89 2.50 2.11 0.77 0.62 0.36
1990-99 2.86 2.16 0.80 0.64 0.33
2000-09 2.69 2.05 0.86 0.80 0.31
2010-19 2.64 2.08 0.91 0.79 0.33
Panel C: Implied mean social status
1940-49 0.57 0.68 -0.20 -0.23 -0.07
1950-59 0.51 0.40 -0.18 -0.14 -0.18
1960-69 0.49 0.44 -0.14 -0.12 -0.23
1970-79 0.43 0.34 -0.11 -0.17 -0.28
1980-89 0.34 0.27 -0.07 -0.15 -0.33
1990-99 0.38 0.28 -0.07 -0.14 -0.36
2000-09 0.36 0.25 -0.05 -0.07 -0.37
2010-19 0.36 0.27 -0.02 -0.07 -0.36
Note: Panel A shows the population shares of the groups defined by surname type (see the text for
definitions). Panel B presents the relative representation of the surname groups among graduates of
medical universities in Hungary. The relative representation is defined as a ratio of the share among
graduates to the population share. Panel C shows that estimates of mean status expressed as standard
deviation units difference above and below the social mean. The mean status is estimated from relative
representations (see the text for more details). Appendix Table A4 shows the same measurements by
using the non-Romani population.
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5. Social Mobility, 1949-2017
5.1. Educational Elites
Our first set of results concerns the estimates of social mobility using data on medical
school graduates. For reasons explained below, we estimate the status of the two high
status social groups (the ..y ending surnames and the interwar high status group) and
the two low status social groups (the Top 20 most frequent surnames and the interwar
low status group) relative to the non-Romani population. In Table A3 we show the
re-calculated population shares and the estimated share of the Romani population over
time.
The relative representation of the five surname groups among Hungarian medical grad-
uates 1940-2017 is shown in Table 2, Panel B (raw data) and Table A4 (adjusted data).
Using these data we calculate the implied mean status for each surname group in each
decade shown in Table 2, Panel C (raw data) and Table A4(adjusted data). Figures 2 to
6 show the implied mean status by decade compared to the non-Romani population and
the implied intergenerational correlation of educational status, assuming a generation is
30 years.
Figure 2 shows the status advantage of high status names over the study period. We see
an intergenerational correlation of ρ = 0.78 for the ..y ending surnames, and ρ = 0.72
for the interwar high status group. The figure shows that at the onset of the communist
period the average ..y ending named individual was about 50% of a standard deviation
above the average person in society, and this advantage has only diminished to about
30% of a standard deviation by present times, showing considerable persistence over two
generations. The interwar high status group has a lower status advantage to begin with,
but progresses towards the mean by an almost identical (slow) pace. There is also no
visible deviation from previous trends after transitioning to capitalism.
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Figure 3 shows the status advantage estimates for low status surnames among medical
doctors. The group of the Top 20 most frequent surnames progresses to the mean more
rapidly, reducing its disadvantage from 18% of a standard deviation below the mean
in the 1950s to 7% below the mean in the 2010s. The intergenerational correlation
coefficient in their case is ρ = 0.59. The interwar low status group shows a more
persistent social status with a correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.84.
Figure 2: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among medical doctors
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status advantage of the high status names (in standard
deviation units) presented in Table 2, Columns (1) and (2) and the linear fit. The status advantage
is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational correlation
coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence, which means
more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale.
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Figure 3: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among medical doctors
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status disadvantage of the low status names (in standard
deviation units) presented in Table 2, Columns (3) and (4) and the linear fit. The status disadvantage
is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational correlation
coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence, which means
more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale.
The richness of the medical doctor data allows us to carry out several robustness checks.
One alternative interpretation of our results could be that what we measure is not
general social status, but the fact that children of doctors are more likely to be doctors
themselves. We argue that this is not the case; rather, that high status persons in a
society will be more likely to transfer their social status to their children who will more
likely to take high status professions, such as that of a medical doctor (or an engineer, an
inventor, or a politician, as we will see). If our results were driven by only within-family
transmission of occupation, then if we picked a set of surnames that are over-represented
among medical doctors in decade t, we would not expect the same names to be over-
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represented again until decade t+3. So we would see very low persistence of social status
from one decade to the next.
We test this idea formally. In Figure 4 the dark line presents the implied social mean
status of the ..y ending surnames among medical school graduates (the same as in Figure
2). The light line represents a new set of surnames: the surnames of those within the ..y
name group who graduated in the 1950s. If within-family transmission drove the results,
we would not see any above-mean social status for these names in the 1960s and 1970s
when their own children would have arguably not been going to medical school yet. The
first feature to note in the graph is that the status of the light-colored social group is
very high in the 1950s, which is purely by construction. The estimated social status is
based on the measure of relative representation, which is the ratio of the surname’s share
among the elite and the surname’s share in the population. For the 1950s ..y named
doctors the numerator is exactly the same as for the general ..y named group, while the
denominator is a much smaller number. The second thing to note is that there is indeed
a small bump in the social status of the 1950s doctors’ names in the 1980s, meaning that
the occupation probably does transfer to an extent within the family. Most importantly,
however, the social status of the 1950s doctor names is virtually identical to the general
..y named group in every other decade as well, even when this cannot be the result of a
direct parent-to-child transfer of occupation. This suggests that the direct within-family
transmission of occupation is an unlikely explanation of the overall strong persistence of
the ..y ending surnames.
On the Appendix Figure A2 we also divide the results based on university rank, treating
Budapest- and non-Budapest based medical faculties separately. Semmelweis University,
the Budapest-based medical faculty is the oldest and most prestigious medical faculty
in Hungary and outranks the non-Budapest medical faculties. While the estimated
status persistence rates are remarkably similar, the results confirm the consequence of
the model that high status groups should be more over-represented the closer one gets
to the top of society. In line with this, we find that the ..y named surname group’s
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over-representation is higher in Budapest as it is in the rest of the faculties, while the
Top 20 most frequent surnames’ under-representation is smaller in the non-Budapest
based faculties. Neither the Top 20 nor the ..y surnames have a geographic distribution
within the country that explains this pattern, and all faculties are recruiting from all
locations, and usually, the Budapest-based faculty is the first choice for those aspiring
for a medical career (Fábri, 2016). In the Appendix (Figure A3), we also carry out the
analysis by gender and find that the results are remarkably similar with somewhat less
persistence among females, which is explained by the fact that family name is inherited
through the patriline and we have more measurement error with women (some were
already married by the time of graduation).
Figure 4: Inheritance of medical status among the ..y surname group
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status advantage of the ..y surname group (dark) and the
subset of ..y names who graduated in the 1950s (light). The vertical axis represents standard deviation
units of social status.
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We next consider graduates from the Ph.D. and Masters programmes of the Budapest
University of Technology and Economics - the largest and most prestigious technical
university in Hungary. Figures 5 (high status names) and 6 (low status names) plot the
results; we relegate the corresponding data points to Appendix Tables A5 and A6. The
figures show very similar results to what we have seen with medical doctors. There is a
high level of persistence of the high status names, even higher than before (.90 or more
in 3 out of 4 cases). The ..y surnames are progressing towards the mean more slowly,
and the correlation in their case is less noisily estimated. Similarly, the Top 20 names
progress towards the mean at a faster pace than the interwar low status names as they
do with medical doctors, and with both low status surname groups social mobility is
slower compared to doctors.
Because we estimated the change in the eliteness of technical Ph.D.s and Masters from
the data in a different way to ensure the most reliable estimate of the correlation coeffi-
cients, the levels are no longer comparable across elite groups, just across social groups
within the same elite. In the Appendix (Figures A6 and A7) we show the results where
we calculate status advantage and disadvantage levels imposing the constant 1% elite-
ness hypothesis. These results show (as we would expect) that PhDs had higher average
status than Masters, meaning that high status names had a larger advantage in PhDs as
they did in Masters, while low status names had a worse disadvantage. However, these
results overestimate underestimate ρ and misinterpret degree inflation as an increase in
social mobility.
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Figure 5: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among technical university gradu-
ates
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status advantage of the high status names (in standard
deviation units) presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (1) and (2) and the linear fit. The status
advantage is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational
correlation coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence,
which means more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale..
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Figure 6: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among technical university grad-
uates
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status disadvantage of low high status names (in standard
deviation units) presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (3) and (4) and the linear fit. The status
advantage is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational
correlation coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence,
which means more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale.
5.2. The non-convergence of the Romani
We separately look at the surnames associated with the Romani minority, and identified
by their substantial increase in frequency 1998 to 2016, and find an unexpected absence
of regression to the mean. On Figure 7 we plot the estimated status of the Romani-
associated names (marked by an X) among medical doctors and technical university
graduates, contrasted with the same figures for the ..y ending surnames (marked by
squares) and the Top 20 most frequent surnames (marked by triangles) among the same
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elite groups. While the previously studied high and low status surname groups both
converge to the social mean over time, the Romani associated surname group, which
was already below-average status in the 1950s, actually diverges from the mean over
time, implying a "convergence" rate ρ above unity. This is a truly striking result.
Not only does this indicate that the Romani minority experienced an ever-declining
social status in the study period, but it also implies that not accounting for this fact
will result in an overestimation of social mobility for the rest of the low status groups.
Though census-grade statistics are not available on the subject (Hungarian law strictly
forbids ethnic profiling), estimates of the size of the Romani community indicate that
it is a rapidly growing part of Hungarian society, currently comprising about 9% of all
Hungarians.28 If a group that is increasing in size is also consistently diverging from the
mean downwards, that means that other low status groups that do converge towards the
mean effectively do not "compete" against an increasing chunk of society. Not accounting
for this would lead to an overestimation of social mobility among low status groups. We
show these alternative sets of (biased) results in the Appendix (Section C.1).
28The few existing and reliable estimates tell us that in 1893 the Romani population share within
modern borders of Hungary was 1.1%. By 1978 this had risen to 3%. But by 1993 this was 4.4%,
and by 2012 8.8%. See Kertesi and Kézdi (1998), Kocsis and Kovács (1999) and Pénzes et al. (2018)
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Figure 7: Mean status of Romani-associated surnames
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status of the ..y surname group (squares), the Top 20 most
frequent names group (triangles), and the Romani associated group (Xs). The vertical axis represents
standard deviation units of social status. The colors and the sizes of the symbols represent data sources
(large, maroon: doctors;medium, dark blue: technical PhD; small, light blue: technical masters.
5.3. General Elites
We now turn to two sets of elite names that are not directly connected to education.
First, we consider the inventors in the PATSTAT database, then the names who ap-
peared in the "Who is Who" books consider "famous people" in general. Again, the
baseline results are presented relative to the non-Romani population. To streamline
the presentation of the results, we only present the status change figures analogous to
Figures 2 - 6.
Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix show the descriptive tables analogous to Table 2 with
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the evolution of the relative representation of the two high status and two low status
surname groups and their implied mean status over time. In both cases, we account for
the change in the relative "eliteness" of the general elites by fixing them at 1% at the
first decade where the data was available and then adjust them by the relative size of
the subsequent cohorts. Alternative specifications of the figures can be found in Sections
C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix.
Figure 8 plots the decadal status estimates for the high status groups in general elites.
We see a very similar pattern to what we have seen with the educational elites. The
estimated status persistence is higher for the ..y surname group (.80 among inventors
and .71 in the Who is Who); lower and more noisily estimated with the interwar high
status groups, with 0.51 in the Who is Who and 0.41 with the inventors. The abnormally
low 0.41 coefficient is due to a singular outlier in the last decade created by interwar
high status names among inventors, otherwise, the group closely followed the pattern of
the ..y ending surname group, where persistence was twice as high.
The low status names in Figure 9 also paint a remarkably consistent picture. The status
persistence estimates are very high and also almost numerically identical for the Top
20 most frequent surnames and the interwar low status surname group both among
inventors and in the Who is Who, ranging between 0.75 and 0.85. Another discernible
feature of both this figure and the previous ones is an apparent lack of any meaningful
trend break at the transition to capitalism. Driven by this observation, we now turn to
a more formal test of the effect of this transition.
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Figure 8: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status advantage of the high status names (in standard
deviation units) presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (1) and (2) and the linear fit. The status
advantage is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational
correlation coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence,
which means more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale.
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Figure 9: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied mean status advantage of the low status names (in standard deviation
units) presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (3) and (4) and the linear fit. The status advantage
is shown on a logarithmic scale. The legends contain the calculated ρ intergenerational correlation
coefficients of status by surname group. A steeper value means less status persistence, which means
more social mobility. The vertical axis is on the logarithmic scale.
5.4. Where does transition to capitalism matter, and where
does it not?
How did the regime change impact mobility? To answer this question, we contrast how
relative representation on a yearly level changed around transition among political elites
compared to medical doctors. We consider the year of the transition as 1990 for the
political elites (the year of the first free and fair elections), while 1996 as the year of
transition for medical doctors (the year when the first cohort graduates who started
their studies after transition).
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Figures 10 and 11 show the relative representation of high and low status surnames
(respectively) among medical graduates (in gray) and members of parliament (in black).
For this exercise, we pool all high status names and all low status names together to
maximize statistical power. The relative representation equals 1 if the share of the name
group is the same in parliament (or among doctors) as it is in society; higher than 1 if the
name is over-represented in parliament (or among doctors), below 1 if under-represented.
We connect black dots among election observations to represent the fact that there is
a degree of continuity between members of parliament over time, while each gray dot
represents a different cohort of medical graduates.
Figure 10 has two striking features. First, there is no break or level shift in the trend
around which high status names regress to the social mean among medical graduates.
To highlight this, we draw 95-percent confidence bands around the trend estimated for
the communist period and the trend estimated for the capitalist period. Second, while
representation among doctors does not follow changing social and political regimes, the
representation among the political elite does. The high status names were still over-
represented in parliament in the first relatively free elections in 1945, while they were
pushed to proportional representation under high Stalinism (the elections of 1949, 1953,
and 1958, the first election after the Red Army suppressed the revolution in 1956).
Oddly enough, as soon as the regime begins to thaw (from the 1960s), the share of high
status names starts to gradually increase to reach the same level of representation as
among the doctors by 1985. During the first free and fair elections their share jumps
and starts gradually regressing to the trend represented by medical graduates.
Figure 11 plots the relative representations of the low status names over time. Again, the
first feature to note is the apparent lack of any effect of transition on social mobility as
seen in relative representation among medical graduates. In Table A11 of the Appendix,
we show that indeed there is no significant change in the level or the slope of the trend
in relative representation around the regime change neither among high status names
nor among low status names. The second interesting feature is again the course of
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the political representation of low status surnames. These had similar representation
in the social and political elites in the short-lived democratic period after World War
II (elections of 1945 and 1947), then their political representation shrank below their
social representation for the next twenty years in a political regime that was supposedly
working to promote their social status. We do not have a final explanation for this,
though we conjecture that the peasantry was heavily represented among the low status
surnames, and communists were always at least suspicious, and more often than not
overly hostile towards this class. This changes during the late 70s, and from then on
social and political representation of the low status names remains very close to one
another. It is also interesting the representation of the low status names in parliament
also fells below their representation among medical names during the Orbán-regime.
Figure 10: High status names in Parliament vs. High status names among doctors
Note: The figure plots relative representation of high status names (both groups combined) among
medical doctors (gray circles) and members of parliament (black diamonds). The vertical lines corre-
spond to the regime change in 1990, and to the first year when medical students graduate who started
school after the regime change.
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Figure 11: Low status names in Parliament vs. High status names among doctors
Note: The figure plots relative representation of high status names (both groups combined) among
medical doctors (gray circles) and members of parliament (black diamonds). The vertical lines corre-
spond to the regime change in 1990, and to the first year when medical students graduate who started
school after the regime change.
We now turn to Figures 12 and 13, where we plot the representation of the high and
low status names in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences against the backdrop of their
representation among medical graduates. In Figure 12 we see the same general pattern
as in Figure 10, namely, that regime changes cause changes in the representation of high
status names in the Academy, though the effect is more muted. An important difference
is that high status names are much more over-represented in science than they are in
politics, and this does not even change during the worst years of Stalinist dictatorship.
This is true even though communists explicitly expelled some members because of their
political sympathies in 1949.
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Figure 13 confirms that indeed the Academy of Sciences is on average more elite than the
Hungarian National Assembly, as the under-representation of low status names is much
worse here as it was either among members of parliament or medical doctors. However,
the relative representation of the low status names here mostly evolved parallel to their
representation among medical doctors, and like there, we do not see any trend break at
the regime changes of the 20th century.
Figure 12: High status names in the Academy of Sciences vs. High status names among
doctors
Note: The figure plots relative representation of high status names (both groups combined) among
medical doctors (gray circles) and members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (black diamonds).
The vertical lines correspond to the regime change in 1990, and to the first year when medical students
graduate who started school after the regime change.
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Figure 13: Low status names in the Academy of Sciences vs. High status names among
doctors
Note: The figure plots relative representation of high status names (both groups combined) among
medical doctors (gray circles) and members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (black diamonds).
The vertical lines correspond to the regime change in 1990, and to the first year when medical students
graduate who started school after the regime change.
It is not possible to carry out such a formal test as above for any direct effect of the
formal Communist takeover in 1949 on the educational outcomes for the upper and
lower surname groups. In part this is because it is much less clear which particular
year one should use as the year of the regime change. In the year 1949 the process was
already complete, but Communists were in effective control of the government and of
state institutions from 1946 on. So the break is actually the era 1946-9. Because of
this, we have to anchor our estimates in the 1950s, by which time the harshest Stalinist
policies were in place, so our estimates possibly miss some of the downward mobility in
this era. On the other hand, this period was proceeded by the significant disruptions of
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World War II, where medical school graduations were limited, and where the population
shares of different groups were changing significantly.
The measures of mobility within the Communist regime considered in this section take
1950-59 as the basis for measuring status within these groups. Since we are measuring
people at age 25 graduating from medical school, and these people would need to have
graduated high school sometime in the period 1943-1952, this would argue that mostly
they would still reflect the pre-Communist social regime. But if the Stalinist regime in
power 1949-1956 pursued explicit policies that barred from universities those of “bour-
geois” social background, then we would miss some of the social mobility created by the
Communist era.
However, if we refer to Table 2 above, and look just at the most robustly measured
high- and low-status groups, the ..y and top 20 surname groups, we see that there is
surprisingly little change in the relative representation of these surnames among medical
graduates between the 1940s and 1950s. There is no sign that under the Communist
regime in the 1950s the share of ..y surnames among medical graduates declined unusu-
ally. Nor is there a sign of any unusual influx of the sons and daughters of the proletariat
bearing the common surnames of Hungary. For the medical schools, communism looks
very much like business as usual in terms of social mobility. A very gradual replace-
ment of the children of traditionally elite groups by the children of the traditional lower
classes.
6. Conclusions
At the end of WWII, and the formal emergence of a Communist regime in 1949, Hungary
had a social class structure that could trace its origins to at least the early nineteenth cen-
tury. The descendants of the traditional aristocracy were still heavily over-represented
in the educational elites, and the lower classes of the nineteenth century were still un-
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derrepresented in these same educational elites.
What happened to these upper-class and underclass groups, as indicated by their sur-
names, in the two very different ideological regimes of postwar Hungary: Communism,
1949-1989 and Free Market Capitalism 1989-2017? We show using surnames that there
was very slow mobility within the non-Romani population in Hungary across both these
regimes, with an intergenerational correlation in educational status that was in the range
0.6-0.8. The result was that even by 2010-17 someone with a surname inherited from the
18th century upper class was still 2.5 times more likely to gain a medical qualification
than the average non-Romani person. And someone with a common Hungarian surname
was 20% less likely to gain a medical qualification than the average of the non-Romani
population.
Our findings show that, in the case of educational elites, social mobility rates under
communism were the same as in the subsequent capitalist regime. These results seem to
be at ad odds with our application of the Becker and Tomes model to regime changes. We
must acknowledge that the economic models of social mobility focus on intergenerational
correlation of income, while our measurement of social mobility is based on social status.
While there is a clear positive correlation between our conceptualizations of elite social
status (e.g., doctors, inventors, politicians) and income in each regime, it could be the
case that changes in the relative earnings of occupations across the social regimes might
blur the comparison. For instance, if doctors were relatively underpaid (compared to
other professions) during communism than in capitalism, then the high persistence of
social status of certain groups measured by the share among doctors in this period might
not go in hand with the persistence of status as measured by income. However, this is not
what the literature suggests, in socialist Yugoslavia, for instance, white-collar high-skill
professions were at the top of the income distribution (Novokmet, 2017).
Our results are more in line with the literature in sociology that argues that differences
in the access to human capital and cultural capital reproduce pre-communist era in-
equalities over the long run (Böröcz and Southworth, 1996), and these are passed on
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very similarly in all industrialized countries regardless of the social regime (Treiman and
Yip, 1989). There is also a long history of thought arguing that although communists
declared that the working class ruled in their regime, in reality, it was increasingly dom-
inated by the intelligentsia (Konrád and Szelényi, 1979). Böröcz and Southworth (1996)
note that this "takeover" happened exactly during the time when the state cut back on
its education budget in the 1970s (Andorka and Harcsa, 1990).
Finally, it is important to highlight what our paper does not say. We do not make any
claim that "communism had no effect" on the social stratification in Hungary, which
would obviously be untrue given how much loss it caused in human life and wealth;
we should also not disregard the impact which large-scale industrialization and the
policies of forced development had on human life. Our findings rather show that even
such an extremely high cost - high effort "reform" (i.e. the communist regime) aimed
to fundamentally transform society could not completely eliminate pre-existing social
differences, which were reproduced over subsequent generations. This is in line with
the findings of (Alesina et al., 2020), who come to similar conclusions looking at the
communist experiment in China using a different methodology.
Consequently, our findings have implications for the debate on the future of capitalism
and policies aimed at increasing economic opportunities. They throw into doubt the
assumption that institutional changes will fundamentally change rates of social mobility.
Interestingly, the same is not true for income inequality. This fell significantly after
the introduction of socialist systems in Hungary and other Eastern European countries
(Mavridis and Mosberger, 2017; Bukowski and Novokmet, 2019; Novokmet et al., 2018).
This suggests that the relationship between inequality and social mobility might be more
complex than the ‘Great Gatsby’ curve suggests (Krueger, 2012), and that privileged
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Appendix A Robustness Checks
A.1 What happens if Assumption (b) is violated
In this section we look at what happens if the variance of status distribution of the
group in question is not equal to the population status variance, i.e. if Assumption (b)
is violated. If this happens, the right hand side of Equation (5) is not zero, and we will
under- or overestimate the latent status xgt . Moreover, the magnitude of the bias will
depend on Assumption (c) on the eliteness cutoff (through the implicitly determined
cutoff y), and the degree to which σg and σ differ from one another.
Figure A1 illustrates this. If the variance social status of group g is less than that of
the population (Panel A), we underestimate the status xgt . Even though we correctly
observe the share of group g who made it to the elite occupation (the mass of people
from group g over the cutoff), the rest of the distribution will be concentrated closer
to the threshold than our assumption implied, so the true mean status of group g will
be higher in reality. The converse is also true: if the true status distribution is more
dispersed, we overestimate the status of the group relative to the population (Panel B).
If any of these two is the case, the choice of the cutoff is not neutral anymore.
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Figure A1: Potential bias in the estimation of xgt
Notes: The figure shows what happens if the group has smaller (larger) status variance than the
population, yet we assume that the variances are identical. Assuming that the same share of individuals
are above the threshold for both distributions will result in underestimating (overestimating) the mean
status of the group relative to the population.
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To address this issue, we first derive formally how the misspecification of the variances
affects our social mobility estimates over tine. Then we consider what persistence rates
would be with medical graduates constituting the top 0.5% or the top 2% of the educa-
tional distribution (Assumption (c)). We also consider what the estimated persistence
rate would be the chosen surname groups began in 1950 with a variance that was only
80% of the population variance, or was 120% (Assumption (c)).
If we assume a different variance for surname subgroups in educational status then this
variance will not be static over time, but will be converging towards the population
variance as the group average status converges towards the population average.
Thus if as stipulated we have observed status
yt = xt + ut
The underlying status is inherited strongly, so that
xt = ρxt−1 · et
where ut, et are independent random errors, then in steady state the population will
have variance in outcomes of
σ2y = σ2x + σ2u =
σ2e
1− ρ2 + σ
2
u
If the surname group has an additional variance in the underlying status x of σ2A, then
in the first generation its variance will be
σ2yAt = σ2x + σ2A + σ2u = σ2y + σ2A
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In the next generation its variance will be
σ2yAt+1 = σ2x + ρ2σ2A + σ2u = σ2y + ρ2σ2A
In n generations the variance will be
σ2yAt+n = σ2y + ρ2nσ2A
Again if the surname groups were to start with less variance than the general population,
then that variance will increase across generations. Thus if the initial variance is
σ2yt = σ2y − σ2A
then in generation n the variance of status of the elite will be
σ2yAt+n = σ2y − ρ2nσ2A
which, given that ρ2 ≈ 0.5, implies that within four generations less than ten percent of
the lower variance in status will remain.
In Table A1 we estimate the intergenerational correlation of the ..y surnames from
medical school graduations where we make different assumptions about the eliteness of
the medical school degree and the variance in educational status of the surname group.
How elite medical school graduates are in fact has very little effect on the estimated
intergenerational correlation, as seen in A1.
The assumption about the variance in status of the elite group has a greater effect on the
estimated intergenerational correlation. The true intergenerational correlation among
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elite groups will be even higher than estimated in cases where the elite group has an
initial higher variance of status. It will be lower where the variance is lower than for
the population. But for long established elite groups, such as the ..y surname ending,
the expected variance is close to the population variance. Similarly for long established
underclass groups, such as the top 20 surnames, the expected variance is again close to
the population variance.
Table A1: Estimated intergenerational correlation, ..y ending








0.5% 0.68 0.78 0.94
1.0% 0.70 0.78 0.89
2.0% 0.71 0.78 0.86
Notes: The table shows how the estimated intergenerational status correlations depend on what we
assume on the eliteness of the occupation (Assumption (c), rows), and on the potential misspecification
of the model due to the violation of the assumption on equal variances (Assumption (b), columns).
When Assumption (b) holds, the assumed eliteness cutoff does not affect the results (second column).
The first (third) column shows that When the ..y named group has less (more) status variance then the
population, the implied status correlation is lower (higher).
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A.2 Heterogeneity across medical faculties
Panel A: ..y ending names by university
Panel B: Top 20 most frequent surname by university
Figure A2: Status persistence among the ..y surname group by university location
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status of the ..y ending and Top 20 most frequent
surname groups by medical faculties. The dashed lines represent doctors in Budapest and non-Budapest
faculties (long vs. short dashes). The solid lines represent the combined group. The figure shows that
over-representation of the high status group (the ..y named) is more severe at the more elite Budapest
faculty, while the under-representation of the low status group (the Top 20 most frequent surnames) is
more sever there. The picture is reversed for the less prestigious non-Budapest medical faculties.
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A.3 Gender
Panel A: ..y ending names by gender
Panel B: Top 20 most frequent surname by gender
Figure A3: Medical status among the ..y surname group by gender
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status of the ..y ending and Top 20 most frequent
surname groups by gender.
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Appendix B Previous estimates of
intergenerational social mobility in
Hungary
In Table A2 we briefly survey previous estimates of Hungarian social mobility in the
literature. Rigorous study of Hungarian social mobility started from the 1960s and
1970s, relying on survey data from 1929 onward (Andorka, 1971), so the comparison
is limited to the last three generations. Some of the previous are qualitatively at odds
with our results. Previous studies find faster regression to the mean as we do (first, third
and fourth rows), and they identify a structural break the end of socialism (second row,
from the 1990s). Note that the definitions and methods used by these studies do not
completely overlap with ours so the scope for comparability is limited.
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Table A2: Previous estimates of intergenerational social mobility in Hungary
Data source Time Description Value
































social status of the
upper class (corre-
lation between the
social class rank of




Notes: The table shows definitions and mobility estimates from previous studies of social mobility in
Hungary.
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Appendix C Additional Figures and Tables
C.1 Figures with the whole population as the reference group
Figure A4: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among medical graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Table 2, Columns (1) and (2) and
the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A5: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among medical graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Table 2, Columns (3) and (4) and
the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
Figure A6: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among technical university grad-
uates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (1) and
(2) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A7: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among technical university
graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (3) and
(4) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
Figure A8: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (1) and
(2) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A9: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (3) and
(4) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
C.2 Figures with the assumption of 1% eliteness
Figure A10: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among medical graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in A4 , Columns (1) and (2) and the
linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A11: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among medical graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in A4 , Columns (3) and (4) and the
linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
Figure A12: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among technical university grad-
uates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (1) and
(2) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A13: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among technical university
graduates
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A5 and A6, Columns (3) and
(4) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
Figure A14: Status persistence of advantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (1) and
(2) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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Figure A15: Status persistence of disadvantaged surnames among general elites
Note: The figure plots the implied social mean status presented in Tables A7 and A8, Columns (3) and
(4) and the linear fit. The average surname status is shown in a logarithmic scale.
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C.3 Additional Tables
Table A3: Adjusted population shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












1940-49 0.025 0.005 0.237 0.076 0.023
1950-59 0.024 0.005 0.261 0.073 0.025
1960-69 0.023 0.005 0.256 0.072 0.027
1970-79 0.022 0.006 0.250 0.072 0.030
1980-89 0.021 0.006 0.246 0.072 0.037
1990-99 0.020 0.006 0.243 0.072 0.048
2000-09 0.020 0.006 0.246 0.073 0.069
2010-19 0.020 0.007 0.251 0.075 0.089
Note: This table reproduces the population shares from Panel A of Table 2 calculated as percentage of
the Non-Romani population. Column 5 shows the estimated Non-Romani population shares of Hungary.
The exact share of the Romani minority is unknown. We use estimates from previous sociological studies
and interpolate for the missing years between them. The data points on which we base the estimations
are 1.08% in 1893 (calculated for the post-1920 borders of Hungary), 3.04% in 1978, 3.56-3.7% in 1984-
87, 4.4% in 1993 and 8.8% in 2011-2013. See Kertesi and Kézdi (1998), Kocsis and Kovács (1999) and
Pénzes et al. (2018).
°
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Table A4: Social status of surname types within the majority non-Romani population,
1940-2017 - medical graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among doctors, vs non-Romani population
1940-49 4.46 5.67 0.51 0.49 0.80
1950-59 3.92 2.85 0.56 0.64 0.55
1960-69 3.61 3.25 0.63 0.66 0.47
1970-79 3.13 2.50 0.68 0.58 0.40
1980-89 2.42 2.03 0.75 0.61 0.34
1990-99 2.74 2.04 0.75 0.62 0.31
2000-09 2.50 1.91 0.80 0.74 0.28
2010-19 2.41 1.89 0.82 0.72 0.30
Panel B: Implied mean social status - eliteness calculated from data
1940-49 0.52 0.62 -0.20 -0.21 -0.07
1950-59 0.50 0.37 -0.18 -0.15 -0.20
1960-69 0.5 0.46 -0.15 -0.14 -0.25
1970-79 0.43 0.34 -0.12 -0.18 -0.30
1980-89 0.34 0.27 -0.10 -0.18 -0.36
1990-99 0.40 0.28 -0.10 -0.17 -0.40
2000-09 0.34 0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.40
2010-19 0.31 0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.38
Panel C: Implied mean social status - 1% assumed eliteness
1940-49 0.56 0.67 -0.21 -0.23 -0.07
1950-59 0.50 0.38 -0.18 -0.15 -0.20
1960-69 0.47 0.43 -0.15 -0.14 -0.25
1970-79 0.41 0.33 -0.12 -0.18 -0.28
1980-89 0.31 0.25 -0.10 -0.17 -0.34
1990-99 0.37 0.25 -0.09 -0.15 -0.37
2000-09 0.33 0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.40
2010-19 0.31 0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.38
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among graduates of medical
universities in Hungary. The relative representation is defined as a ratio of the share among graduates
to the majority non-Romani population share. Panels B C show that estimates of mean status expressed
as standard deviation units difference above and below the social mean using the two different sets of
assumptions discussed in the text. The mean status is estimated from relative representations (see the
text for more details).
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Table A5: Social status of surname types, 1940-1999 - Ph.D. graduates of Budapest
University of Technology and Economics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among Ph.D. graduates, vs total population
1960-69 4.40 3.24 0.56 0.57 0.70
1970-79 4.17 2.24 0.55 0.57 0.40
1980-89 3.81 2.70 0.60 0.58 0.40
1990-99 3.81 2.66 0.68 0.64 0.37
Panel B1: Implied mean social status - total population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.56 0.43 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11
1970-79 0.56 0.31 -0.20 -0.18 -0.31
1980-89 0.55 0.40 -0.18 -0.18 -0.31
1990-99 0.52 0.37 -0.14 -0.15 -0.33
Panel B2: Implied mean social status - total population, 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.56 0.43 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11
1970-79 0.54 0.28 -0.20 -0.18 -0.28
1980-89 0.50 0.36 -0.17 -0.18 -0.30
1990-99 0.50 0.36 -0.12 -0.14 -0.31
Panel C: Relative representation among Ph.D. graduates, vs the majority non-Romani population
1960-69 4.28 3.15 0.56 0.56 0.68
1970-79 4.05 2.17 0.52 0.56 0.40
1980-89 3.68 2.59 0.57 0.56 0.38
1990-99 3.64 2.52 0.63 0.62 0.36
Panel D1: Implied mean social status - the majority non-Romani population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.55 0.43 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12
1970-79 0.56 0.28 -0.21 -0.20 -0.31
1980-89 0.52 0.37 -0.20 -0.20 -0.34
1990-99 0.50 0.36 -0.15 -0.17 -0.34
Panel D2: Implied mean social status - the majority non-Romani population, 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.55 0.43 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12
1970-79 0.52 0.28 -0.20 -0.18 -0.30
1980-89 0.49 0.34 -0.18 -0.18 -0.31
1990-99 0.47 0.34 -0.15 -0.15 -0.33
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among Ph.D. graduates
of Budapest University of Technology and Economics. The relative representation is defined as a
ratio of the share among graduates to the population share. Panel B shows that estimates of mean
status expressed as standard deviation units difference above and below the social mean. The mean
status is estimated from relative representations (see the text for more details). Panel C and Panel D
repeat the calculation of Panel A and B by using the majority non-Romani population instead of the
total population. Panels B and D show the implied social status levels with both sets of assumptions
(calculated level of eliteness vs. assumption of constant 1% eliteness).
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Table A6: Social status of surname types, 1960-1999 - Undergraduates of Budapest Uni-
versity of Technology and Economics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among undergraduates, vs total population
1960-69 3.49 2.89 0.66 0.70 0.58
1970-79 3.38 3.00 0.72 0.70 0.46
1980-89 2.95 1.92 0.80 0.79 0.43
1990-99 2.48 1.85 0.87 0.81 0.34
Panel B1: Implied mean social status, vs total population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.73 0.60 -0.20 -0.15 -0.25
1970-79 0.80 0.69 -0.17 -0.18 -0.37
1980-89 0.74 0.40 -0.11 -0.12 -0.43
1990-99 0.69 0.43 -0.09 -0.12 -0.60
Panel B2: Implied mean social status, vs total population, 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.46 0.38 -0.14 -0.10 -0.18
1970-79 0.44 0.40 -0.10 -0.11 -0.25
1980-89 0.40 0.23 -0.07 -0.07 -0.28
1990-99 0.33 0.21 -0.05 -0.07 -0.36
Panel C: Relative representation among undergraduates, vs the majority non-Romani population
1960-69 3.39 2.80 0.63 0.68 0.56
1970-79 3.27 2.91 0.69 0.68 0.44
1980-89 2.83 1.86 0.76 0.75 0.41
1990-99 2.35 1.75 0.82 0.76 0.31
Panel D1: Implied mean social status - majority non-Romani population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.70 0.57 -0.20 -0.17 -0.25
1970-79 0.76 0.68 -0.18 -0.18 -0.38
1980-89 0.70 0.38 -0.14 -0.15 -0.44
1990-99 0.64 0.40 -0.11 -0.15 -0.62
Panel D2: Implied mean social status - majority non-Romani population, 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.46 0.37 -0.15 -0.11 -0.18
1970-79 0.43 0.38 -0.11 -0.12 -0.25
1980-89 0.37 0.21 -0.09 -0.09 -0.28
1990-99 0.31 0.20 -0.05 -0.09 -0.37
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among undergraduates of
Budapest University of Technology and Economics. The relative representation is defined as a ratio
of the share among graduates to the population share. Panel B shows that estimates of mean status
expressed as standard deviation units difference above and below the social mean. The mean status is
estimated from relative representations (see the text for more details). Panel C and Panel D repeat the
calculation of Panel A and B by using the majority non-Romani population instead of the total popu-
lation. Panels B and D show the implied social status levels with both sets of assumptions (calculated
level of eliteness vs. assumption of constant 1% eliteness).
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Table A7: Social status of surname types, 1970-2019 - Inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among inventrors vs total population
1970-79 3.84 4.21 0.56 0.54 0.51
1980-89 3.44 2.89 0.50 0.62 0.34
1990-99 3.16 3.06 0.44 0.61 0.46
2000-09 3.63 3.25 0.56 0.69 0.43
2010-19 2.90 1.34 0.66 0.68 0.50
Panel B1: Implied mean social status vs total population, eliteness calculated from data
1970-79 0.49 0.46 -0.25 -0.20 -0.20
1980-89 0.52 0.46 -0.31 -0.18 -0.34
1990-99 0.41 0.40 -0.31 -0.20 -0.25
2000-09 0.44 0.41 -0.25 -0.15 -0.21
2010-19 0.40 0.14 -0.18 -0.12 -0.23
Panel B2: Implied mean social status vs. total population, 1% assumed eliteness
1970-79 0.50 0.54 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21
1980-89 0.46 0.38 -0.21 -0.15 -0.34
1990-99 0.43 0.41 -0.25 -0.17 -0.25
2000-09 0.47 0.43 -0.18 -0.11 -0.27
2010-19 0.38 0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.23
Panel C: Relative representation among inventrors, vs. the majority non-Romani population
1970-79 3.74 4.07 0.54 0.52 0.50
1980-89 3.31 2.78 0.49 0.61 0.33
1990-99 3.00 2.93 0.43 0.57 0.43
2000-09 3.38 3.01 0.52 0.64 0.40
2010-19 2.64 1.22 0.60 0.62 0.46
Panel D1: Implied mean social status vs. the majority non-Romani population, eliteness calculated from data
1970-79 0.47 0.46 -0.25 -0.21 -0.21
1980-89 0.50 0.44 -0.33 -0.20 -0.36
1990-99 0.40 0.37 -0.33 -0.21 -0.25
2000-09 0.41 0.40 -0.28 -0.17 -0.25
2010-19 0.37 0.10 -0.21 -0.15 -0.27
Panel D2: Implied mean social status vs. the majority non-Romani population, 1% assumed eliteness
1970-79 0.49 0.52 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23
1980-89 0.44 0.37 -0.23 -0.17 -0.37
1990-99 0.40 0.40 -0.28 -0.18 -0.27
2000-09 0.44 0.40 -0.20 -0.14 -0.30
2010-19 0.36 0.07 -0.17 -0.15 -0.25
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among Hungarian inventors
come from worldwide patent statistical database PATSTAT. The relative representation is defined as
a ratio of the share among graduates to the population share. Panel B shows that estimates of mean
status expressed as standard deviation units difference above and below the social mean. The mean
status is estimated from relative representations (see the text for more details). Panel C and Panel D
repeat the calculation of Panel A and B by using the majority non-Romani population instead of the
total population. Panels B and D show the implied social status levels with both sets of assumptions
(calculated level of eliteness vs. assumption of constant 1% eliteness).
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Table A8: Social status of surname types, 1960-2009 - famous people from the Hungarian
edition of "Who is Who"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among famous people vs. total population
1960-69 4.44 2.93 0.51 0.75 0.54
1970-79 4.15 3.35 0.58 0.77 0.55
1980-89 3.09 2.40 0.67 0.81 0.55
1990-99 2.99 1.84 0.70 0.85 0.49
2000-09 3.13 2.07 0.69 0.82 0.40
Panel B1: Implied mean social status vs. total population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.55 0.47 -0.18 -0.10 -0.18
1970-79 0.44 0.38 -0.15 -0.07 -0.17
1980-89 0.40 0.28 -0.12 -0.05 -0.18
1990-99 0.43 0.27 -0.11 -0.07 -0.28
2000-09 0.34 0.21 -0.10 -0.03 -0.28
Panel B2: Implied mean social status vs. total population, , 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.56 0.40 -0.21 -0.10 -0.20
1970-79 0.54 0.44 -0.18 -0.09 -0.20
1980-89 0.41 0.31 -0.14 -0.07 -0.20
1990-99 0.40 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 -0.23
2000-09 0.41 0.25 -0.11 -0.07 -0.31
Panel C: Relative representation among famous people vs. majority non-Romani population
1960-69 4.32 2.84 0.50 0.73 0.51
1970-79 4.03 3.25 0.56 0.75 0.54
1980-89 2.99 2.31 0.64 0.79 0.52
1990-99 2.84 1.75 0.68 0.81 0.46
2000-09 2.91 1.94 0.64 0.76 0.37
Panel D1: Implied mean social status vs. majority non-Romani population, eliteness calculated from data
1960-69 0.54 0.46 -0.20 -0.10 -0.18
1970-79 0.43 0.37 -0.17 -0.09 -0.18
1980-89 0.38 0.25 -0.14 -0.05 -0.20
1990-99 0.40 0.25 -0.14 -0.09 -0.30
2000-09 0.31 0.18 -0.12 -0.07 -0.31
Panel D2: Implied mean social status vs. majority non-Romani population, , 1% assumed eliteness
1960-69 0.55 0.38 -0.23 -0.10 -0.21
1970-79 0.52 0.43 -0.18 -0.10 -0.20
1980-89 0.40 0.30 -0.15 -0.07 -0.20
1990-99 0.38 0.20 -0.12 -0.07 -0.25
2000-09 0.38 0.23 -0.14 -0.09 -0.33
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among Hungarian famous
people from the Hungarian edition of "Who is Who". The relative representation is defined as a ratio
of the share among graduates to the population share. Panels B1 and B2 show that estimates of mean
status expressed as standard deviation units difference above and below the social mean with both set
of assumptions on eliteness. The mean status is estimated from relative representations (see the text
for more details). Panel C and Panels D1-D2 repeat the calculation of Panel A and B by using the
majority non-Romani population instead of the total population.
77
Table A9: Social status of surname types, 1940-2019 - members of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among the members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
vs. total population
1940-49 6.13 9.82 0.43 0.46 1.05
1950-59 4.78 3.77 0.37 0.73 2.51
1960-69 3.66 0 0.44 0.57 1.48
1970-79 3.34 7.65 0.41 0.43 0.12
1980-89 5.32 5.28 0.28 0.91 0
1990-99 8.94 7.96 0.43 1.17 0.27
2000-09 5.28 2.58 0.73 0.94 0.60
2010-19 5.34 6.55 0.44 1.10 0
Panel B: Relative representation among the members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
vs. majority non-Romani population
1940-49 6.00 9.60 0.41 0.43 1.03
1950-59 4.67 3.68 0.36 0.70 2.46
1960-69 3.55 0 0.43 0.56 1.44
1970-79 3.25 7.42 0.40 0.43 0.11
1980-89 5.13 5.07 0.27 0.87 0
1990-99 8.52 7.57 0.41 1.12 0.25
2000-09 4.92 2.41 0.68 0.87 0.56
2010-19 4.86 5.96 0.40 1 0
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among the members of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The relative representation is defined as a ratio of the share among
graduates to the population share. Panel B repeats the calculation of Panel A using the majority
non-Romani population instead of the total population.
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Table A10: Social status of surname types, 1940-2019 - members of the Hungarian Par-
liament
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Panel A: Relative representation among the members of the Hungarian Parliament,
vs. total population
1940-49 3.02 2.91 0.62 0.79 0.43
1950-59 0.93 1.26 0.38 0.60 0.81
1960-69 1.49 2.25 0.38 0.68 0.25
1970-79 1.60 2.11 0.56 0.75 0.66
1980-89 2.28 1.94 0.85 1.17 0.11
1990-99 4.26 3.99 0.74 0.66 0.41
2000-09 2.85 4.53 0.88 0.75 0.12
2010-19 2.80 1.00 0.81 0.52 0.03
Panel C: Relative representation among the members of the Hungarian Parliament,
vs. majority non-Romani population
1940-49 2.96 2.83 0.60 0.76 0.43
1950-59 0.91 1.24 0.37 0.58 0.80
1960-69 1.45 2.19 0.37 0.66 0.25
1970-79 1.55 2.04 0.55 0.73 0.63
1980-89 2.21 1.87 0.81 1.12 0.11
1990-99 4.05 3.79 0.69 0.62 0.40
2000-09 2.66 4.23 0.81 0.69 0.11
2010-19 2.55 0.92 0.74 0.47 0.02
Note: Panel A presents the relative representation of the surname groups among the members of the
Hungarian Parliament. The relative representation is defined as a ratio of the share among graduates
to the population share. Panel B repeats the calculation of Panel A by using the majority non-Romani
population instead of the total population.
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Table A11: Formal tests for structural break in social mobility rates in 1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High status Low Status
..y ending Interwar
high status
Top 20 Interwar low
status
Pooled Pooled
Trend -0.0127 -0.0180 0.0022 0.0044 -0.0178 0.0024
(0.0154) (0.0302) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0149) (0.0023)
Regime change = 1 0.388 -0.131 0.0062 0.0046 0.2500 0.0049
(0.249) (0.488) (0.0385) (0.0784) (0.2400) (0.0368)
Regime change × Trend -0.0337 0.0142 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0116 -0.0010
(0.0211) (0.0412) (0.0032) (0.0066) (0.0203) (0.0031)
Observations 41 41 41 41 41 41
R2 0.273 0.064 0.152 0.138 0.207 0.167
Notes: the regressions of the mean implied social status of surname groups (in columns) on time trend,
a dummy regime change indicating years after 1996 and an interaction term between trend and regime
change. Standard errors in parentheses.
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